Rejection of Apriori Statements in Quine’s "Two Dogmas of Empiricism"

What conclusions can be drawn from this? The supposed apriority in the history of science could have been dismissed as ‘’merely psychological,’’ if not the case of non-Euclidean geometry. The central propositions of Euclidean geometry eventually proved to be methodologically immune from revision, hence their ‘’apriority’’. The only way how such statements can be subjected to revision is through rival theories, some of which may overthrow the statement held for apriori, together with the theory constructed around it. That, however, makes the ontological status of apriori statements rather problematic. One of the best solutions is proposed by Putnam, and it consists in substituting the notion of absolute apriority with the notion of contextual apriority that gives certain statements apriori status in the context of existing relevant theories. It does not mean that statements can not be absolutely true and are always purely contextual. It only means that we lack proper tools for distinguishing the apriori from the aposteriori, the apriori from the immune to revision, or perhaps that such a distinction does not exist at all.…